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LETTER

TO

HIS GRACE

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.,

UPON

THE ACTUAL CRISIS OF THE COUNTRY

IN RESPECT TO THE

STATE OF THE NAVY.

BY A FLAG OFFICER.

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TO HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K. G.

MY LORD DUKE,

I had the honour of addressing to your Grace, on the 29th of October, a privately-printed statement, upon the deficient condition of our Dock-yards, and of our Naval Force, in comparison with that of Russia and other powers : and I feel it now my duty to address your Grace publicly upon the same subject.

Under the present peculiar situation of this country, with the formidable Russian Baltic Fleet, although now laid up for the winter, yet with its stores, provisions, and every thing on board, which will enable that fleet to be ready for sea in a few days ; it is to be lamented that more energetic measures have not been adopted in our ports, which remain nearly in the same inactive state as before ; not one ship of force having been put into commission since that time. There is a growing anxiety, my Lord Duke,

in the country upon this subject ; there seems to be only one opinion among officers of rank and reputation in the Navy, and, indeed, in nearly the whole of Her Majesty's Naval Service, that not a day should be lost in laying aside half measures, and commencing with vigour and exertion to equip a fleet at least equal to contend with that of any other nation, to protect our country, our colonies, and our trade.

It has been reported that seamen do not come forward in answer to the placards ; but your Grace is no doubt well acquainted with the way heretofore practised in time of peace of manning our Navy, not leaving it to one method only, but adopting every means, pursuing especially the old custom of commissioning many ships, appointing officers, and thus renewing that spirit and animation in our ports which has so long been smothered. The zeal of Her Majesty's Naval Officers, and of the Royal Marines, is aroused at hearing of a foreign fleet in array, ready perhaps to wrest not only the superiority of the Ocean, but even the command of the Channel itself, from Great Britain ; and they only await Her Majesty's commands to embark on board Her Majesty's ships to exert themselves in manning them. They would endeavour to communicate the same zeal to our

seamen, and would encourage men to enter into the ships they might be appointed to. Our ports would soon exhibit a different aspect, and once more the English nation might see, as in 1790, nearly 40 sail of the line at Spithead, ready, as before, if necessary, to assert her independence; the whole country, under God, would feel a renewed confidence instead of the false security into which it has been led, and the peace of Europe might be preserved. Great Britain looks to the just influence which your Grace must naturally possess with Her Majesty's Ministers, to induce them to use prompt measures to put the country into a more warlike attitude, in order that it may be prepared to resist aggression from any quarter.

In now publishing the statement, with little alteration, which I beg leave again to lay before your Grace,

I have the honour to remain,

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient Servant,

A FLAG OFFICER.

Dec. 15. 1838.

TO HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K. G.

MY LORD DUKE,

Deeply impressed, as are many other Naval Officers, with the alarming position of the country, in consequence of its present unprotected state from foreign aggression, I beg leave to call your Grace's attention to the following remarks and facts.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord Duke,

Your Grace's most obedient Servant,

A FLAG OFFICER OF HER
MAJESTY'S FLEET.

London, October 29. 1838.

To every considerate person, who is competent to form an opinion on the subject, the extraordinary apathy and blindness of the people of England, with regard to its present critical situation, must be a cause of surprise. Scarcely any one gives a serious thought to more than our domestic con-

cerns. The Church — Tithes — Poor Laws — Rail Roads—Ireland! Our Parliament is chiefly engrossed in these and other home matters, and in the squabbles arising out of them; and party spirit runs so high, that, although there have been sufficient indications of war — preparations for war with this country manifested by Russia and other nations for a length of time — the important subject of our foreign relations, and inquiries into the state of the country's defences against a foreign enemy, are turned away from with impatience, as interruptions with which even legislators have nothing to do. In the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston's assurances that our foreign affairs are all going on very well; and the Secretary of the Admiralty's assertions, that "England is prepared " whenever, or from wherever, any enemy may " come to attack her"* — that she has a sufficiently strong Navy ready for any emergency, lull that House and all the country into a feeling of safety and security; and those deceitful sedatives are applied to the nation, while, actually, an overpowering enemy may be said to be at her doors: for, suppose our Cabinet were to commit itself in any way with Russia, France, or America, and instantly a war must be the consequence, in which either or all of these countries (knowing our weakness and their own strength) may be too

* Mr. Charles Wood's Reply to Mr. Attwood's Speech on the Russian Navy.

ready to engage. And what would be the first result? * Immediately would be discovered to the English people the totally inefficient state of the country for war; England would be seen to be without defence for her own shores, her colonies, or her commerce; without any means arranged for carrying on a war, offensive or defensive. This, truly, is her present condition.

And is it only when war is actually declared that a country begins to prepare? Has England ever before been found in such a situation? † Does

* Can any inquiring person entertain a thought, for an instant, that the enormous Russian Fleet in the Baltic, faithfully described by Captain Craufurd, which has been increasing and training for years past, is intended for anything else than to coerce or invade this country, whenever the favourable opportunity shall arise? Had Lord Durham possessed half the English feeling of Captain Craufurd, he would have experienced less enjoyment in his cruise on board this Fleet, and less delight at the Emperor's over-abundant civilities. His Lordship would then have thought more of his own country as Captain Craufurd did, and have made such representations at home, that our Navy would not be what it is at present,—our ports nearly empty of ships;—in fact, our naval preponderance made over to Russia and France. Look back upon the year 1814—the Emperor Alexander, with other crowned heads, sailing in and admiring the English Fleet. Observe the contrast in 1838—England without a fleet, and her Ambassador, Lord Durham, sailing in and admiring the Russian Baltic Fleet, which could *then*, and *may next Summer*, desolate England, ruin her commerce, and blockade her shores, unless England is aroused from her stupor.

† Before the war of 1793, there were 16 sail of the line as guardships, besides cruising frigates, in our different ports, with a foundation of good seamen in each: they sometimes cruised for exercise. This force was a nucleus for a navy;

any other country so reduce itself? Do the nations on the Continent disband their armies, because of their mutual protestations of amity towards each other? We see the contrary all over the Continent; notwithstanding each power has its strong fortresses and positions on its frontiers, its standing Army is still kept up, and each nation closely watches the other. England, too, has her frontier — THE SEA; and, formerly, she had her strong fortresses — HER SHIPS — her “WOODEN WALLS,” and therefore she did not fortify her shores; and while these were in existence, she could defy any attack: no French Army (the only one she had then to fear) could venture to cross the Channel.*

and, upon the sudden war breaking out in 1793, we were speedily prepared, and the next year able to gain the victory of the 1st of June, after engagements of three days with the French fleet. This war did not find us in the situation we are now. “Our Dock-yards had been carefully supplied with stores, the ships were in a rapid course of repair, and of the 115 ships of the line, the greater part were in good condition.” — *Locker*.

* When we were menaced by Buonaparte’s Legions, on the opposite coast, not a praam, not a boat, could venture out; Sir Edward Owen’s Squadron defied them all. There was a fine spirit in our Navy then. Where is it now? For years past, there has been scarcely any encouragement given to it: all has been parsimony. Many of our ships are so inferiorly manned, that they can hardly perform evolutions with foreigners, to the mortification of their officers and seamen. There is constant lamentation from all ranks, except those who receive favours. In all other Navies, no expense is spared to have their ships and crews as perfect as possible. What a contrast!

These defences, however, no longer exist : the wooden walls are thrown down ; the country is laid open ; an Army may land without meeting any resistance whatever ; and defenceless must England remain unless her walls are set up again.

But all nations speak peace ! Is it for peace that Russia has, in addition to her increasing armies, assembled and organised fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas, amounting to about 45 heavy ships of the line, and 40 frigates (some of them equal to line-of-battle ships) ; — their state of preparation in the summer months being such, that the large Baltic Fleet could be upon our shores in so short a space of time, that we could not, by any possible means, be prepared to receive it ? * Had Captain Craufurd's observation in his pamphlet, written two years ago, been attended to, England would have been in a different position to that she occupies at present. Well are the feelings of this patriotic officer expressed in the following sentence : — “ It was a strange feeling “ that came over me, as an Englishman, and an “ officer in the British Navy, on finding myself

* In the *Courier* of October 26th is the following paragraph : — “ Petersburg, October 13th. — On the 9th of last “ month two ships of the line were launched, in the presence “ of Admiral Lazareff. They are the —— (a Russian “ name), of 120 guns, and the ——, of 84.” These ships, fully manned, will, no doubt, add to the Russian Fleet, when the weather permits of their being sent to sea. The crews of the Russian ships are formed while they are building ; so that when the ship is launched her crew is complete.

“ at sea with 26 Russian line-of-battle ships,
 “ with nearly 30,000 men, better soldiers than
 “ they are sailors, and four months’ provisions on
 “ board ; knowing, as I did, that for the protection
 “ of the coasts of my own country, of our ports,
 “ of our mercantile shipping in the Baltic, the
 “ North Sea, and the Channel, we had but 7
 “ line-of-battle ships in a state of preparation, and
 “ those, I believe, not fully manned. I confess that,
 “ confident as I felt in the superior skill and ac-
 “ tivity of my countrymen, I almost trembled for
 “ the preservation of their ancient sovereignty
 “ of the seas.” Peaceable Russia ! Having al-
 most crippled Turkey, carrying on a murderous war
 with the brave Circassians *, and going on straight
 to India, without commerce, or a single colony,
 and as to the defence of her own empire, being
 almost invulnerable ; yet with a powerful and ex-
 pensive fleet, every year increasing in force and
 efficiency, ready for battle in a moment, and having
 four months’ provision always on board ! †

* “ The brave Circassians ” to be reduced to the state of the Poles ! Will the English like to be reduced to the same situation, — to beg of the Autocrat of Russia to spare them ? The Circassians have their arms in their hands, England has not. The enemy in great force, and England still sleeps on !

† The Emperor, who is no ordinary man, speaks peace to Lord Durham and to England ; but he has constantly been preparing for war with England, and is using every effort to gain over all Europe to his sinister views. Observe his Majesty, and the method he has adopted of travelling about, generally *incog.* : he is almost in perpetual motion ; at one time seeing how things are going on in the Black Sea and in

Is it for peace that France has out-built us in her navy, and not only produced a fleet of the largest ships (being superior to most of ours), but, what is even of greater importance, she has adopted a method, by a registration of all her seamen, of manning it in a very short time? * Is it with peaceable intentions towards England that France has established the blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres (two of the most unjust acts, contrary to the Law of Nations and of War that a nation has ever been guilty of, especially towards young and unformed Governments

Circassia; then cruising in the Baltic, and exercising his Fleet; afterwards visiting all the Powers of Germany and Holland, bribing military officers, making alliances for his children, and sending his eldest son, who travels upon the plea of ill health, but who, with more ability and more ambition than his father, is aiding him to bring his schemes to completion; which are becoming so obvious, that England alone, duped and deceived, is now despised and laughed at by the world. Why do not the English open their eyes? It is truly astonishing what an indisposition there is in this country to hear the disagreeable truth of England's present weakness, in its moral as well as in its physical condition. In the interior of the country, scarcely any one has an idea that we are not in a perfect state of defence; and perhaps nothing will awaken the nation from its stupefaction, but the sound of the enemy's cannon on our shores, or the fact that hordes of Cossacks are landing to plunder London or Brighton. The ignorant reply generally, is, "Our wooden walls will protect us:" and where are they?

* The distinguished Captain Napier's plan, for the registration of our seamen, is worthy of being inquired into, and adopted.

with which she is *not at war*, and to which, as a great nation, France should, surely, have been lenient); and which blockades, being most injurious to commercial countries with which she is at peace and a peculiar stab to our commerce, would formerly have been disallowed by England, because she would have had a sufficient Naval Force to assert her rights, and the just rights of other nations every where, and would have kept up Squadrons equal or as superior to those of other powers, as they are now inferior. England would have remonstrated with France upon the injury done to her Commerce, and the injustice of those proceedings which she now sanctions; and France would not have attempted to continue such blockades. Whatever our representations may be, they are evidently treated with contumely or indifference. Is it to preserve peace with England that French ships of war are to be found nearly every where on the ocean, while France has not one quarter of the trade to protect which England has?—that a French frigate lately entered Sydney, in New South Wales, and reported that she was one of four frigates employed in that part of the South Seas, for the protection of their *unmolested* whalers? Or is it not — what will be obvious to every one of common understanding — that France, having gotten before us greatly in the force and construction of her Ships (while England has been asleep), is now aiming likewise to be before us in seamanship and practice? And is it not, therefore, another part

of her plan to make pretexts for keeping as many ships as she can at sea? King Louis Philippe cares not for expense in such an important matter, and therefore he sends a fleet of twenty-two ships of war (frigates, bomb-vessels, &c.) to bombard a friendly power for a debt of 120,000*l.*, in order to have the seamen of these ships well exercised for war.

But is France meaning to have a footing in Mexico? for she has, in fact, quietly taken to herself the right to “rule the sea,” which England has passively yielded to her; if, therefore, the unhappy Mexicans cannot resist this *magnanimous* nation, they may have to pay to the French the expense of the expedition, and be ruined besides. This England might have prevented, without going to war, if our Minister at Vera Cruz had been supported by a respectable Naval Force.*

With regard to the United States. Is it looking to a continuance of peace that she has sent a formidable squadron to South America †, of seven

* See the Duke of Wellington’s speech upon Lord Strangford’s motion, August 14. 1833.

† The United States Squadron in South America is as follows:—

North Carolina, rated 74 guns, mounts 90 thirty-two pounders, her complement 1000 men.

Independence rasée, mounts 64 long thirty-two pounders.

Erie, rated 18 guns, mounts 24 long twenty-four pounders, 250 men.

Vincennes, rated 18 guns, mounts 24 long twenty-four pounders, 250 men.

men-of-war, all perfect of their kind, a part of which would be sufficient to take possession of the whole of our contemptible squadrons there, at the Cape, and in India, and to send them, with our three Admirals commanding them, to New York? This the American Commodore might the more easily do, from the early information which he would get of a war (in about five weeks only from Washington), across the Isthmus of Darien, by which route he constantly receives despatches; so that he might have the command of the whole Indian and Southern oceans long before our Government could convey the intelligence to our Admirals; and consequently before any information could arrive there, the whole of our ships of war, and our commerce too, would be nearly annihilated in those seas.

Again, supposing a war with the United States to take place, a large part of their Navy would be very soon fitted out. America does not want for seamen, and she has already too many British seamen, which should have been retained in our own ships, as a nucleus for a Navy: and a few of their powerful ships, with troops, might run into Halifax harbour; and all Nova Scotia would be in their power. There is scarcely any land defence

Fairfield, rated 18 guns, mounts 24 long twenty-four pounders, 250 men.

Dolphin schooner, mounts 12 twenty-four pounders (carronades).

Boxer schooner, mounts 12 twenty-four pounders (carronades).

to Halifax ; — the troops are nearly all in Canada. George's Island is not of great force alone for large ships to pass ; and they might run up to the very dock-yard itself, and land with impunity, unless we have some large ships of war there. The Americans might also, at any time, take possession of Cape Breton, and establish themselves at the fine harbour of Louisburgh, and fortify it. The plentiful coal mines would be a great acquisition to them, for coal is much wanted in the United States. New Brunswick would soon follow ; and all communication being cut off by the Americans having the superiority at sea, how long could we preserve Canada ?

It is a fallacy to suppose we can keep our American possessions unless we have the command at sea, for the proximity of the United States to our ports in North America gives them an immense advantage over us. They must always be before us in their naval equipments, unless we anticipate their movements by keeping a large naval force in America ; for, suppose they were to give the whole strength of their country to fit out their Navy, and at the same time to lay an embargo on their ports, we should not know of it for three or four weeks at soonest, and this would be so much start of us, as we should only then begin to fit out ships, which would take three months at least, to equip and man, and would have to make the voyage across the Atlantic, in the winter, when the westerly gales so usually prevail.

By this calculation, the United States would have been in active warlike operation a considerable time before our ships could arrive.

A war with England would be popular with most of the States, from the benefits likely to accrue to them—probably the wresting from us the whole of our possessions on that side the Atlantic.

There can be no hesitation in asserting that, at the present moment, with the alarming prospect before us, forty sail of the line would not be too many to have ready, to add to the inefficient force which we already have distributed among our extensive colonies.

The United States has now a Navy, such as she never had before ; her ships are of prodigious strength. Those called 74's mount from 90 to 146 guns, of the heaviest metal, the complement of the smallest, 1000 men. Those called frigates, of 44 guns, generally carry 60 thirty-two pounders. Those called sloops, of 18 guns, 24 long twenty-four pounders, the complement, 250 men. The Delaware, a 74, mounts 100 guns, forty-two and thirty-two pounders—her lower gun-deck is only 1 foot shorter than that of our Britannia, of 120 guns ; and she threw more shot, at one discharge of her guns, than the Britannia, — when Sir Pulteney Malcolm's flag was flying in her,—by 600 weight.

When America unexpectedly declared war against us, in 1812, she had about six or eight frigates only, whilst we had an immense naval force, amounting to about 1200, of which 100 were

ships of the line, and upwards of 100 frigates. Yet she contrived to take three of our large frigates, by her very superior ships, in single actions. What a contrast is there between the power of the two nations, then, and at present! How great would be the value, now, of the 2000 seamen voted by Parliament, and considered by Lord Minto, upon his own responsibility, as not needful — the Navy being sufficiently large! Surely the most zealous economist in the House of Commons would not desire that the real bulwarks of the country should have been thus neglected! Who can say that much English blood may not be spilt upon England's own shores before many months run out, which for centuries have been preserved from the tread of an enemy's foot?

The false economy which has been acted upon with regard to our Navy will probably entail upon us the expenditure of millions. If a war does arise, it will be the most disadvantageous one for England, ever known. It will be a struggle for her very existence as a great nation.

We have 7000 good soldiers in Canada, and not one too many; but without a large naval force how easily might the communication with Canada be cut off!

Immediately upon a war, the Atlantic would be strewn by fast-sailing American privateers (the beautiful New York packets would soon be transformed into vessels of war), even to the English and Irish Channels; our trade would be nearly

destroyed before we could have any thing to protect it; many of the English seamen captured would enter on board their privateers, and our own coast would not be safe. Brighton, and other places near the sea, could be plundered and burnt at any time, in the state they now are, by a few frigates. There are no defences whatever. And have we not set the Americans an example by burning Washington? How often, during the French war, have naval officers wished that the French coast was more accessible, instead of being so difficult to approach, not only by its intricacy from sunken rocks, with strong tides, but that wherever a vessel could approach the shore, she would be sure to find shot flying at her from numerous batteries; while, on the contrary, ours is a plain coast, and will allow an enemy to land almost anywhere. There are few impediments; the tides are less strong; and, with the exception of Portsmouth and Plymouth, there is scarcely a battery to be found on the whole coast.

And are we to set it down that, because the French and Americans were not so enterprising in their last war with us, when we were truly a warlike country, they will be the same now in the unarmed state to which we are reduced? With all our egregious folly, in reducing the country to the miserable condition it is in, upon the plea of *economy*, let us not add to it by under-rating our enemies, or those who may soon be so, and absurdly build upon what England *has* done; what she may

do remains to be seen, and greatly depends upon those who, being her constituted watchmen, should long since have called upon the nation to look with suspicion at the increasing navies around us; and then *all parties* in the country would have come forward and enabled the Government to keep up a corresponding armament, that, at least, we might not be taken by surprise. Upwards of two months have elapsed since strong representations were made by naval officers of repute, full of anxiety for their country, to Lord Melbourne, Lord Minto, and Lord Palmerston, and assurances were given that the subject should be attended to. What has been the result? One line-of-battle ship, the *Ganges*, has been commissioned; and six steamers (two of them packets) are ordered to be built in the different yards. To hurry on the *Stromboli* steamer in the Portsmouth yard, the shipwrights directed to finish the *Indus*, of eighty guns, for launching, are obliged to be turned over to this steamer. Such is the deficiency in shipwrights! What might not have been done in these valuable two months for the safety of our land! Is the First Lord of the Admiralty aware of the responsibility with which he has charged himself before the nation in his reply to the Duke of Wellington's speech at the close of the last Session, on the reduced state of the Navy? * In truth, it is difficult to believe

* Some months ago, a stop was put to the finishing of the ships on the stocks in Portsmouth and other yards, — Lord Minto having pronounced that we had ships enough.

that Lord Minto's speech, in reply to the Duke of Wellington's just observations, was reported correctly. After speaking of "our powerful fleets in the Americas," which actually existed only in his Lordship's words, for (with the exception of the Cornwallis, half armed, and a frigate or two) they were only *Lilliputian* squadrons, made up chiefly of donkey-frigates and smaller craft, which a few shot from a French or American ship of the line out of reach of their carronades, would send to the bottom of the ocean, — his Lordship made a most extraordinary declaration to the country, that he considered the Navy did not require being increased, and that he actually had not thought it necessary to employ all the means which Parliament had put in his power. It was a bold but fearful responsibility for Lord Minto to declare in the House of Lords, that he had taken upon himself not to employ all the seamen which the country had voted; and this, while our maritime rivals were making such rapid and gigantic strides. When has there been a day since his Lordship has been First Lord of the Admiralty, that our Navy required not to be augmented, — the number of men increased, — if a vigilant look-out had been kept upon other powers? But, as they have advanced, England has retrograded, and the responsibility remains with Lord Minto.

But, it may be asked, "Have we really no Navy ready, or which could be got ready soon enough for the defence of our country? Could the Rus-

“sians land an army, made up of half-barbarians
 “and Cossacks to plunder us? Could France or
 “America come upon us in the way described,
 “without being soundly beaten?” Let every one
 divest himself of his former confidence or ignorance,
 and inquire for himself; let him at least ask, is it
 not a new and a strange thing that this nation should
 be entirely unaffected at the sight of a neighbour-
 ing power, putting itself in the very attitude to
 attack it with an overpowering, well-exercised
 Fleet, which has been increasing for several years,
 only waiting for orders in the summer or autumn
 to take aboard troops, elated with the prospect of
 plunder before them, and preventing our know-
 ledge of their designs by an embargo, giving us,
 perhaps, not two days’ notice of their approach,
 burning Sheerness dock-yard, and our ships, our
 towns on the coast, and, perhaps, London itself!
 “Their line-of-battle ships,” observes Captain
 Craufurd, “are armed with four very formidable
 “guns on the lower deck, throwing 40-lb. shells
 “horizontally. The damage that might be done by
 “one of these shells lodging, and exploding in
 “the interior of a ship, is incalculable. One of
 “their new eighty-fours has a large gun of this
 “sort, which throws a shell of 120 lbs. The
 “gun weighs, in English measure, 6 tons, 1 cwt.
 “3 qrs. 17 lbs. The charge, for throwing it, is
 “sixteen pounds of powder. It is worked by six-
 “teen men, and they are six minutes between each
 “round. The noise is said to be tremendous.”

The Emperor of Russia is not an inactive person ; he was exercising his fleet in the Baltic during the equinoctial gales ; the fleet was blown into port on the 9th of October ; he loses sight of nothing. Not many months ago, his Admiral Ricord (brought up in our service) was visiting and examining our dock-yards.

Suppose this Russian fleet, of about thirty sail of the line, and twenty frigates and steamers, was heard to be at sea, and approaching the Nore, perhaps to destroy Sheerness dock-yard (which cost millions).* The Isle of Sheppey is not for-

* Can any person believe that Marshal Soult, who embarked at (and, no doubt, well reconnoitred) Sheerness, and every foreigner who comes to this country, does not know our defenceless condition, or that the Emperor of Russia is not aware that all his deep-laid plans are succeeding to his most sanguine hopes ; and that if, last summer, we had attempted to interrupt his schemes in the East, or to have remonstrated with him upon his atrocious and murderous war against the brave Circassians (Circassia being the chief barrier to India, which he is endeavouring to break down, and which, should he prove successful, he may treat as he has Poland), he might not, with all ease, have sent his Baltic Fleet, of fifty or sixty fully manned ships (*the same Lord Durham sailed about in*), and troops, and have spread desolation in this country ? The Russian Baltic Fleet will soon be blockaded ; the ice will, thanks to the Providence of God, confine it to the Baltic, and England will be safe for the winter. Let England beware that she is not found in the spring without a sufficient naval force in her ports ready for what most likely will happen ere long. England sincerely desires peace ; but will most probably be engaged in a ruinous war if she does not prepare her defences before it be too late. Let her but open her eyes to her state, have done with party feelings, and apply the proper remedy to the disease. Arm a force as

tified ; we must look to our wooden walls. “ Where are they to be found ? ” At Sheerness, there is the *Howe*, rated 120 guns ; she has not enough seamen on board to keep the ship clean, and to man her boats ; marines are, therefore, employed in them — a service for which they never enlisted. The Admiral, whose flag is flying in her, is sometimes rowed by them ! * “ But,” it may be asked, “ cannot men be put on board her, and she can be “ sent to sea at short notice ? ” The *Howe*, at present, is not in a state of readiness for sea ; she has weed and muscles on her bottom ; she must be docked, and her bottom caulked and coppered, — an operation not done in a day ; besides, some of her masts are said to be defective ; they must come out, and, perhaps, may have to be replaced by new ones ; and she may have other defects to be made good ; and where are the men to come from ? Will an enemy lay to, — wait till we are ready ? † The

soon as possible, fit to cope with other nations, and then let Russia show her fleet outside the Baltic, or upon our shores !

* What would the noble Lord Howe, whose name this fine ship bears, have said to be rowed about by marines for want of seamen ? We see in Sir John Barrow’s interesting memoir, that in 1788 Lord Howe resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty, because Mr. Pitt determined to keep down the Navy Estimates below what the veteran Admiral *knew* was necessary for keeping the Fleet in that state of efficiency which the honour of the country required.

† Landsmen are told we should take up the buoys. No doubt we should, but there are pilots as well as buoys ! — That we should sink ships, and the enemy could not get up the Thames. Surely we may, but we must be more active than

Britannia and Royal Adelaide, at Portsmouth and Plymouth, are probably nearly in the same state; at least they must be manned; their lower deck guns must be taken in, their masts well examined; in short, they are little better than ships in ordinary: and these *three* are the only guardships in England, and were reckoned by the Secretary of the Admiralty in the 20 sail of the line actually *at sea*! It is to be hoped that if such an assertion is made again, the naval members will not be so inert and regardless of it as before, and that the whole House will make itself acquainted with the facts; it is very easy for any Member, even now, to inquire into the validity of the Honourable Secretary's observation. He will find that three of the twenty ships of the line were without lower-deck guns, and with reduced crews, mere troopers, and not equal to frigates, and three

we are at present, or a force of ships, larger than Lord Exmouth battered Algiers with, throwing shells as well as shot, may be at Gravesend with a flood tide before much can be done; and what can be then effected for defence under the broadsides of such a force? There is much mention made of the great number of steamers we have, which may be turned to account. The river steamers are too slight for guns of any size, without being strengthened; the Scotch and other steamers would do better; but let it be remembered that they must be prepared for guns. None of them have timbers to bear the breaching and recoil of a large gun; and if a gun is placed amidships, to fire in any direction, a proper bed must be made for it. Is all this to be prepared when the Russians are at the Nore? Will Tilbury Fort defend England? Are there a million of muskets in the Tower? Is the arsenal of Woolwich full of arms and ammunition?

more are the flag ships in our ports, good for nothing almost, in their present state.

The next naval defence held up is the *demonstration ships*, about 12 sail of the line at the different ports. Many suppose those ships are really in a state of readiness for sea ; but they literally make no more demonstration of naval defence than the other ships in ordinary, except that, upon close examination, they are found to be less *unready* for commission.* They have, indeed, what the other ships in ordinary have not, — their masts, and sails, and stores prepared ; but they would require months to get ready for sea. And what would this force be, after all, when compared with other navies ? This number of ships, at least, should have been always kept upon our own shores, fully equipped, manned, and exercised, to be added to when needful. The only demonstration ships that meet the eye at our ports, are the flag ships ; and this is a *false* demonstration of force, which foreigners are not deceived by†, however the English may ; for with their masts swayed up, they

* The Ganges, 84, a *demonstration* ship, *without even her lower masts in*, was put in commission about the 18th of October. She had to be *docked*, and various things to be done to her first. Let it be remarked, by those who suppose a *Fleet* can be easily equipped, how long it will take to send this *one* ship to sea, and some judgment may be formed as to what time would be required to fit out 15 or 20 sail of the line.

† Foreigners of different nations frequently visit our naval arsenals ; some have expressed their astonishment at no naval preparation being made, while Russia has such a fleet ready. Where are your ships ? has been the question often asked.

are only more forward in appearance than the others, and are nearly without men ; they require docking, and probably some new masts, and much doing to them before they can be fit for service.

BEHOLD THE WOODEN WALLS OF ENGLAND ! the naval force quite ready (according to the Secretary of the Admiralty) to defend her unfortified, unprotected, naked shores, against powerful fleets, fully manned, and in a state of perfect organization, ready to attack her ! We can afford to send ships and marines, sappers and miners, to the north coast of Spain, to throw up fortifications there ; but can spare nothing, it appears, for our own unguarded shores. We shall be glad of every ship and every sapper and miner, perhaps, before many months pass. Let but a *quarter* of the Russian Baltic fleet anchor at the Nore, St. Helen's, or at Spithead,—can any one conceive the panic that would arise ? And what is there to prevent their taking possession of the Isle of Wight, establishing themselves there, and fortifying it ; at the same time they might also land anywhere on the Sussex coast, or wherever they pleased, and plunder it. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, to resist them. Then would the people of England be glad if the word “ECONOMY,” from the *destructive* purposes for which it has been used, had been banished from our vocabulary, sooner than it should have brought upon them such a calamity, or even the expense which must then take place, and probably the ruin of this once great nation.

Resting upon our former superior Navy, there are no batteries except Old Sandown Fort, upon the eastern part of the Isle of Wight, to protect St. Helen's, or the approach to that fine roadstead, Spithead. Situated as we are at present, surely batteries should immediately be formed in good situations, that there may not be a possibility of an enemy's fleet *ever* taking possession of these anchorages with impunity.* Officers, who have returned from Cronstadt, mention the strength of that place; that upwards of 200 guns were commanding the port, some of them carrying shot of 120 lbs. weight. The Russians are still continually erecting more batteries, setting us an example. Russia, *in time of peace*, has a powerful fleet ready for the offensive; at the same time taking care that her chief naval port (exclusive of her Navy) shall be well defended. Our Engineer Officers, when they no longer see a Navy to protect our coast, must feel as anxious (as do the generality of Naval Officers) to begin, in their department, to erect batteries, and mount guns.†

With regard to seamen not entering into the Navy as they used to do, how easily is the reason explained! At the end of the war in 1815, we had

* Mud forts, with long heavy guns, and furnaces for heating shot, are the best sea batteries, and more *economical* than stone work. A mud fort of 2 or 3 guns, in the West Indies, beat off the Leviathan, and another 74, after firing at it a long while, and having lost many men.

† See a pamphlet, entitled "Wooden Walls," said to be written by a General Officer, a Colonel of the Royal Engineers.

guardships in every port, with some hundreds of seamen in each. The ships never wanted men, good seamen entered, who, after a time, desired more active service, and on their removal into sea-going ships, the vacancies were soon filled up. How is it now? If seamen come to Portsmouth to enter, what do they behold? A naval port without a Navy! A general want of spirit and animation; the great arm of the country *withered*—paralyzed; a gloom pervading the place. A donkey frigate* may be fitting, perhaps, and the single guardship, the *Britannia*, presents herself; but, like the *Howe*, with so few men, that they have hard work to wash her decks, keep her clean, and man her boats. The seamen turn away in disgust; the watermen join them in talking of old times, when England had a Navy and feared nothing; and they grumble together over the state England is brought into; and an old waterman observes, “Well, we shall have the “Russians upon us by-and-by, and then what shall “we do?”† This is often their observation.

From the guardships not being kept up as formerly, and with our present unheard-of slug-

* *Donkey* frigates, as the Navy designate them, are now of little value in war, compared with the ships of other Powers, which generally carry long heavy guns, the *Donkey* only carronades; so that the ships with long guns may lay out of carronade reach, and beat them to pieces.

† What an exact representation is the *Britannia*, in her present unarmed state, of the kingdom she bears the name of, which is in the same lamentable condition!

gish proceedings, when the evil day does come upon us, which, from every appearance, is fast approaching, if we can get crews at all for our ships, they will be disorganised masses of all classes of men, except the most desirable one, — the good seaman, which should have been reserved in the Navy. There may soon be a call for more ships than England possesses, and more seamen than she can by any means obtain * ; the merchants would never approve of all their seamen being taken at once, and their ships laid up ; and this must positively be the case if a war breaks out suddenly, and our Navy is not in a more forward state than it is at present. What do the merchants of England think of the probable fate of their commerce if a war occurs ? There are no ships to convoy them, or to protect them. After the *Edinburgh* and *Pique* sailed, about the 20th of October for Mexico, there was not in any port of England, one line-of-battle ship or frigate ready, or likely to be so, for several months for any service whatever ; so that if a collision takes place with Sir Robert Stopford's squadron in the Mediterranean, to disable any part of it, or if anything turns up in America, where it appears to be still necessary to send troops, not a ship of war of any description has England to send out ! Naval officers, seamen, and the inhabit-

* The yachts under the Earl of Yarborough preserve some good seamen ; they will be of infinite value in a war if they come into the Navy.

ants of sea-ports are not blind *; they know that our "powerful fleets," spoken of in Parliament, do not in reality exist. *Russia* and *France* are allowed to take away the sovereignty of the seas from England, and may take her colonies, and may destroy her commerce, whenever they please, and England seems willing to submit.

In our present state, it would be madness to go to war: but a preparation for war is the only true way to preserve peace, and England has justice on her side.

Had a positive enemy directed our councils, he could not have contrived, by any ingenuity, to have placed the country in more complete jeopardy. For example: *Russia*, the aggressive power, fighting her way (by her intrigues and stratagems) to India, and armed for a *naval* war; *France*, with a Navy, which she is bringing forward with unremitting energy, and spreading all over the world, making unjust blockades, and, in fact, ruling the ocean! These two Powers together have nearly 60 ships of the line, and about 30 or 40 frigates, some of 60 guns, in commission, all fully armed and manned for war. The United States, with the powerful squadron in South America, ready to take the full possession of those seas, and also likely to seize

* In reply to the Duke of Wellington, Lord Minto said, he *believed* we had 17 or 18 ships of the line at sea; the Secretary of the Admiralty, some time before, asserted, in Parliament, that we had 20. This is a discrepancy, unless Lord Minto had diminished the Navy 2 or 3 ships. The fact is, There were, at the time, 14 effective ships, and not 20.

upon all our American possessions ; England, without a ship ready in her ports, and having just 15 efficient ships of the line*, *not one more* (for two

* Of these 15, one ship, the Hercules, 74, is at present without the lower-deck guns, having a regiment on board from Gibraltar to the West Indies ; she leaves the regiment there, and takes another on board for Halifax : she cannot be reckoned as a 74 for three or four months. The turning our ships into troopers is much to be deprecated, and should never be done but upon an emergency ; it disorganises a ship completely, and it is not fair to the men. The old 46 gun frigates, of which there are too many, and too small to cope with the enemies' 60 gun frigates, would make excellent troopers, like the Apollo.

The ships of the line, in commission, are these : —
 Britannia, 120, not a quarter manned, and defects to make good.

Flagship at Portsmouth.

Howe, 120, not a quarter manned, and defects to make good.

Flagship at Sheerness.

Royal Adelaide, 104, not a quarter manned, and defects to make good. Flagship at Plymouth.

1. Princess Charlotte, 104. (A small inferior ship.) Flag ship, in the Mediterranean.
2. Asia, 84.
3. Rodney, 92.
4. Vanguard, 80.
5. Bellerophon, 80.
6. Pembroke, 74.
7. Minden, 74.
8. Talavera, 74.
9. Hastings, 74.
10. Donegal, 78.
11. Russell, 74.
12. Hercules, 74. At present no lower-deck guns, and carrying troops.
13. Cornwallis, 74. American station, comprising all the West Indies.
14. Malabar, 74. Ditto.

} Mediterranean.

Flag ship, at Lisbon.
 Lisbon.

others, at the Cape and in India, are without lower-deck guns), many of them small 74's, not so strong as the 60 gun frigates of other nations ; also 4 or 5 large frigates, a few small ones, and some donkey frigates and other trash. This is England's naval force, to protect her shores, her colonies her commerce, and her Queen ; and all these ships are upon the peace establishment, — that is, with reduced complements of men, and consequently not considered fully ready for war.*

It is to be lamented that the Queen, who, as Princess Victoria, liked to be on the sea, did not visit the Isle of Wight, as was expected, last summer. It would have inspirited the nation, and have appeared auspicious in the first year of her Majesty's reign ; but it would have grieved her Majesty to observe the state of her harbour of Portsmouth. The Navy, once the pride and (under Providence) the safety of England, now scarcely to be discovered but in the inanimate hulks in ordinary. What a sight for the Sovereign of Great Britain ! Is her Majesty aware that her dominions and colonies are all in danger from the superior Navies of other nations, which are in array and ready to act against her, — that in this, the early

Wellesley, 74. East Indies. Half manned and half armed.

Melville, 74. Cape. Ditto ditto.

15. Edinburgh, 74. Mexico.

Ganges, 84. Portsmouth, fitting out.

* Some of our ships are short even of the short complement. The Bellerophon, in the Mediterranean, was, a month since, 50 seamen deficient.

part of her Majesty's reign, Britannia has ceased to "rule the waves?" Does her Majesty know that, if a sudden war broke out, and found us in our present condition, the enemy might come upon us with their frigates, or even privateers, and ravage any part of our coast? There is, in truth, *nothing* ready to resist them.

Observe our opposite neighbour! The French King visited the sea coast last summer, and a squadron attended upon him. His Majesty went on board his ships, and not only directed the Minister of Marine to issue an order of the day (which was copied into our papers) expressing his Majesty's high approbation of their state and order, but even handsomely rewarded the seamen.

This is the way in which Louis Philippe is stimulating *his* Navy to exertion, while *our* marine is suffered to dwindle into insignificance. Our best officers are dispirited, and can only expect to be blockaded in their own ports, should a war (which sooner or later appears inevitable) break out.

Under this degraded state, has England a single certain resource left, so that some seamen may be obtained for ships (which must soon be put in commission for her bare protection) without impressment? There is not one. Every thing depends upon the chance of men entering for our ships. The Coast Guard service formerly produced seamen to man some ships when required; but they have been taken from the Navy. It must be admitted, however, that they could be of

great use towards the defence of the country. A fine body of men, the Marine Artillery, was a help to look forward to. They were a most superior class, fit for any service, and had been years in training. At one moment six out of eight companies were disbanded, not even sent to join the Marine Corps, but turned adrift! How serviceable would these men have been in our ships, now that we are, after the example of Russia, having in each ship four heavy guns to throw shells! For what officer could venture to trust sailors with shells in an action, in a newly manned ship, until he knows and has confidence in his men? Some time since, when ships were paid off, their petty officers who wished to remain in the service were retained in the flag ships, in order to be put on board any ship of war newly commissioned. These were generally old tried seamen, valuable men, who had gained their situations by their ability and good conduct. Good petty officers are the very foundation, or fathers, of a ship's company. This excellent regulation was put an end to, no doubt, as being *too expensive*, and this superior class of men were afterwards turned adrift with the rest of the ships' companies. Many, probably, would go to America.* Wherever the eye is

* When the Delaware, American 74 (100), was in the Bay of Naples, 1835, the ship was nearly manned with Englishmen, who, no doubt, had expatriated themselves. English naval officers who visited her observed this, and especially that the *petty officers* were English. (Petty officers are quartermasters,

directed, injury in some shape has been committed upon the best, if not the only, bulwark of England, — *the Navy*. There is, indeed, a gloom over the Naval Service! All classes in it are disheartened. There appears to be a black cloud hanging over Great Britain. England! the former admiration — the garden of the world! No nation so apparently prosperous, no nation so rich, so strong, were she prepared: but no nation so unprepared for a sudden emergency: solely arising from the delusion which has come over those who might have prevented, by a timely foresight, the mischief likely to ensue, and which requires a master mind, under God, to avert.

What is to be done under the present grievous circumstances? We behold formidable fleets ready to act against us, — not, like ours, with peace complements of men, but full complements, and complete in every way. We have nothing in our ports, and we have not an arm to turn against them. The inhabitants of Brighton, and all our undefended sea coasts, would not be safe in their houses; neither can it be said that London would be secure from being plundered and burnt. War may take place in a moment. We are tempting the whole world (especially the United States, by the conquests we are offering her) to a war. We had better, perhaps, give up the boundary line,

boatswains' and gunners' mates, captains of forecastle and of tops, &c.)

than engage in a war with America, which would be most disastrous to this country.*

We should not lose a day in arming, at least, the same number of guardships in our ports we had before, but of the largest two and three deck ships, with the same number of men,—9 or 10 sail of the line to begin with ; and as men come forward, their crews might be increased, and more ships might be added. Large frigates might also be put into commission from time to time, steamers got ready, and other measures used to defend our land ; and thus we might, in a certain time, have something to depend upon increasing our naval force as our neighbours have done, while we slept. We cannot do too much. Every effort should be used to get men ; bounty should immediately be offered ; the Army gives 3*l.* ; and the finest ships we have being commissioned would be some attraction to seamen. As midshipmen are now, and would be, scarce, the old complement of volunteers of the first class should be resumed, and a very large proportion of boys allowed to each ship : many could be supplied by the Marine Society.

The shipwrights in the dock-yards should be immediately increased, and encouragement given

* The President, in his speech, not very long since, mentioned “ the *irritating question* of the boundary line ” with England. † Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, most influential men, and formerly friends of England, in their speeches recommended war with England, sooner than give up the view America entertained of the boundary.

to them (the superannuation after 30 years' service, might be restored); for, if a war took place, there would be more difficulty in procuring them. No time should be lost in obtaining a *large* increase of these and other valuable artificers. There is now a deficiency even for *present* purposes; and what will it be if a war suddenly takes place; where are they to be procured? The ships nearly ready on the stocks should be completed and launched as soon as possible, and all the building slips immediately filled by the largest two-deck 92 gun ships, and 50 or 60 gun frigates and large steamers being laid down and built with the greatest expedition; 60 gun frigates and steamers* might also be built by contract, which would be "*economical*," for at present they would be built cheap: some of the smallest 74's should be cut down to 50 or 60 gun frigates; and if the thirty-two pounders which have been re-bored and are placed on the Edin-

* England has not launched a ship of any force for several years; yet France and other nations have been continually at work, sending beautiful ships into the water. Where can we match the superb ships of France, so excellent in their classes; the first rates, all of 126 guns, not of 104, as some of our economical ships, like the Princess Charlotte, our flagship in the Mediterranean, which our officers and sailors have the mortification to compare with the splendid French Montebello, 126, and others; their next class, two deckers, of 86 guns, but mounting 100; then those of 82, which compose her ships of the line; then her frigates, 40 of 60 guns, thirty-two pounders, and 20 smaller frigates, but all with heavy metal?

burgh's main deck instead of eighteen pounders, will bear to be double shotted, and answer, all the other 74's should have them as soon as possible. We ought to do every thing in the way of increasing our naval armament as soon as possible. *There is no time to be lost.* Many of the formerly fine, but now almost useless, 46 gun frigates, with eighteen-pounders, cut down to corvettes, with heavy metal. Not a ship of the line or frigate should have a gun of less calibre than a thirty-two-pounder.

The dock-yards should be filled up with stores. And this would be real "*economy*;" for, let the people of England have their eyes opened to see the alarming state in which they have been placed, a state which has no parallel in her history (the probable very near approach of war, and England totally unprepared for it, and more defenceless than any country in Europe); and then such will be the old patriotic feeling and desire to recover the high position which Great Britain formerly held, that the Government will be called upon by the whole nation to arm, if only to preserve her own land from pillage; and unhappily much will require to be done in the way of defence, which might have been avoided by a common foresight and a timely provision. The quantity of warlike and naval stores required, will then, indeed, put the country to an enormous expense, which might be lessened by even at present completing our dock-yards with

stores.* There must, no doubt, be a call for money to enable the Government to do what has lately been entirely neglected, — the protection of the country entrusted to its care : but where is the Englishman who will not come forward liberally to aid in defending his country from foreign invasion, to preserve England from falling from an eminence which she has been permitted to attain to a low rank in the scale of nations, — a catastrophe which will bring the contempt of the world upon her, in that it will have been entirely her own suicidal act, which she had it in her power to avoid ?

And who can reflect with composure upon the pages of history hereafter recording of England, that, after sustaining an honourable war for twenty-two years, for the liberty of Europe, during which she arrived, under God, at the very *acme* of renown by her straightforward dealings, and her glorious victories by land and by sea, boldly defying hosts which threatened to invade her shores, and at one time being at war with nearly the whole world ; ruled by an usurper — a conqueror, against whom no nation could stand but England, and whose armies no soldiers could vanquish but England's ; — that England, still possessing all the

* The price of hemp has risen 5*l.* or 6*l.* a ton in this month (October). Where is an immediate supply to be procured, if we have war with Russia ? Should she, at the best time for herself, declare war, no doubt she would stop the supply of hemp and tallow.

former means of sustaining her power, abandoned all her former energies, and shrunk into insignificance from her timid and unworthy policy with other nations, having weakened her moral influence in every Cabinet of Europe, and exhausted her physical resources, either by keeping up for years the disgraceful civil war in Spain (at which every Englishman of feeling must blush), and by which not only was much English blood unworthily spilt, but a drain was opened to carry off all the savings of the Government, so much boasted of, enough to have kept her bulwarks in a proper state of defence; — that other nations, viewing her changed character and condition, took the advantage of it, and, adopting some of England's former vigour, prepared by every device to crush this once powerful nation, which although all admired, and were once thankful to, yet all were jealous of; — and that, after they had succeeded in blinding her Government by a deep policy and craft, quieting her with flattery and assurances of peaceable intentions, yet all the time sharpening their armour, and grasping the very weapon she had laid down—that, at the fitting opportunity, when they saw they would soon be unmasked, and England would awake and break down the bridge which they had for the first time in her history been permitted to construct, they united, and suddenly pounced upon this unguarded country? Then the Nation's eyes were opened; British valor was then called forth; but what could

it effect? It was too late to begin to collect and organize forces. England, the most powerful, the most favoured land in the world, was obliged to succumb; and was compelled in future to exist by the sufferance of the powers who, not by force of arms, but taking advantage of her blindness, and the weakness she had reduced herself to, soon put an end to her greatness! And this will assuredly be the fate of England, unless she is roused from her apathy: and not an hour should be lost in unchaining and unmuzzling the British Lion, and setting him free, to show to the world that his power has been only fettered by his *own keepers*, but that his strength still remains undiminished!

BEWARE, ENGLAND, OF BEING FOUND SIX MONTHS HENCE IN YOUR PRESENT POSITION! YOU HAVE A RESPITE FROM RUSSIA FOR SIX MONTHS; LET NOT THIS BE LOST!

Extract from "Le Journal des Débats," copied into "The Times" of November 1. 1838.

"The French navy possesses, at present, a *matériel* which does not fear comparison with that of any other nation in the world; for, if we strike out of the pompous list of the British Navy published by the British Admiralty the vessels unfit for sea, we shall find that Great Britain, herself, the Queen of the Ocean, cannot muster a greater number of vessels than France."

This is, undoubtedly, not an exaggerated picture. France may, indeed, boast! When we compare their 49 or 53 powerful ships of the line, and counting their 40 60 gun frigates (superior in force to our old 74's), they may be reckoned, in comparison with us (to say the least) to have between 80 and 90 ships of the line. The French have always built superior ships to ours. Their smaller ships are also better classed than ours.

We have three-deckers enough if they were all launched and had all thirty-two pounders; 11 ships of 120 guns, and two building; 5, of 104 guns; 3, of 110 guns (building); 23, of two decks, from 80 to 92 guns (of which 7 are building); 45, of from 74 to 78 guns (of which 3 are building). This gives us 89 sail of the line (including our very weak 74's), of which 15 are building. With regard to frigates, we are very deficient. We have only 10 rasees, including the Vernon; 10 of 50 to 52 guns, inferior ships for the present time, of small scantling, and by their small masts easily dismasted in action. We appear to have, by the Navy List, about 50 42 to 46 gun frigates, carrying eighteen pounders. This is now a very inferior class of ship; they are less in force than the corvettes of France and America, which mount long twenty-four to thirty-six pounders. We have 3 or 4 good frigates of 36 guns, carrying long thirty-two pounders, like the Pique and

Inconstant ; 7 more are building ; but there are not, apparently, men enough in the dock-yards to complete and launch them. There are some nice little ships, like the *Cleopatra*, of 28 long thirty-two pounders ; 4 more of these are building ; a quantity of others, with 24 thirty-two pounder carronades, which are scarcely of any use for war, and about 50 or 60 corvettes and brigs, mostly of less force than those of other nations. Our chief deficiencies, then, are in the largest sized two-deck ships of 90 guns ; of *rasées* and 60 gun frigates ; and of heavy steamers. Steamers may be made good use of in war ; but let it be remembered that one well-placed shot might, by disabling the boiler or paddles, completely put a steamer *hors de combat*.

RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET.

Captain Craufurd reports the Russian Navy in the Baltic, in the year 1836, to be 3 three-deckers, rated 110 guns ; 6 two-deckers, carrying 84 guns ; and 18 of 74 guns ; a *rasee* of 56 guns ; a frigate of 52 guns ; and 17 frigates of 44 guns ; 3 large corvettes, and a number of smaller vessels, all well manned, and so expert (from some of their officers having served with our fleet), that he observes, “ it is quite astonishing.” * He speaks of a ship of 130 guns to be launched in 1838, and one of 84, and another of 74 building ; this will make their Baltic fleet 30 ships of the line, besides frigates, all ready in the summer to pass over to England.

THE NAVAL FORCE OF FRANCE.

In the former statement it was said that France had 57 ships of the line in commission or ready for it, and their

* The Admirals Lazareff and Ricord (the former commanding the Black Sea Fleet), have been brought up in our navy with the two smart officers, Sir Frederic Maitland and Sir William Parker.

There are said to be both English officers and petty officers in the Russian navy. Offers have been made to our lieutenants to command their ships, and petty officers are offered 60*l.* a-year.

names were given. This account was furnished by a French to an English Naval Officer, both in command not long ago in the Mediterranean; but it appears to have been incorrect, by 4 or 8 ships of the line. The "Morning Chronicle" gives (as from Baron Tupinier) the list of the French line-of-battle ships as 49, none under 82 guns, but does not report the number of frigates. The remaining force of the Navy, furnished by the same French Naval Officer before mentioned, and here recapitulated, seems nearly to agree with the report of Baron Tupinier, as copied into the "Times." France has 40 frigates, first class, each of 60 thirty-six pounders; 10 frigates, second class, each of 46 thirty-six pounders; 15 frigates, third class, each of 32 guns; 10 frigates, fourth class, of 26 guns; 24 corvettes, each from 20 to 32 guns; 16 gun brigs; 27 steamers, the majority of 160 horse power, and each of them well armed.

Every ship of the line is provided with 4 howitzer cannon, eighty pounders, called *à la paixhans*. Every frigate of the first class is to have 2 of eighty; steam boats of 160 horse power, 3 of eighty; frigates of the second and third classes, sloops and brigs, 4 of thirty.

The French dock-yards are spoken of, by English officers who have visited them, as being complete in stores, and, no doubt, in men, by the number of ships they have launched. The following was taken from the "Times:"—

"The *Moniteur* contains M. Charles Dupin's review of "a report on the present state of the French Navy, presented to the Minister of Marine by Baron Tupinier, "member of the Board of Admiralty, &c., but of which we "have not, at this moment, time nor space to give a lengthened notice. From this document, it appears that the "French Government could, immediately on the occurrence of war, increase the naval force actually at sea, "namely, 22 sail of the line and 36 frigates, to 40 sail of "the line and 50 frigates; that besides the seamen necessary to man this large additional force, there would re-

“main a surplus of 15,000 men to form the crews of vessels of minor rates or size. It further appears that a Royal Ordinance of the 1st of February, 1837, directed, that there be kept up or advanced towards construction a reserve of 13 sail of the line and 16 frigates, by which the force at sea could be further raised to 53 sail of the line and 66 frigates, and that the number of war steamers should be fixed at 40, of which 16 are now in commission, and 13 more rapidly proceeding towards completion.” *

LIST OF THE AMERICAN NAVY, 1838.

	Guns.	Built.	Station.
Franklin	74	1815	New York.
Washington	74	1816	New York.
Columbus	74	1819	Boston.
Ohio	74	1820	New York.
N. Carolina	74	1820	Pacific.
Delaware	74	1820	Norfolk.
Pennsylvania	74	1837	Philadelphia.
Alabama	74	building	Portsmouth.
Vermont	74	ditto	Boston.
Virginia	74	ditto	ditto.
New York	74	ditto	New York.

The Pennsylvania and, it is said, two of the others (no-

* To show the *activity* of our dock-yards, the Warspite, 78, has been occupying one of the Portsmouth docks for some years. Nothing has been done to her until a few months ago, when it was determined to rascé her. Perhaps there were not shipwrights to work upon her! In 1827, the Hercules, and another ship of 86, two-deckers, but with guns on their gangways, and two immense frigates of 60 guns, were building rapidly in Toulon dock-yard. One ship, the Nile, of 90, was upon the stocks at Plymouth: *there she remains at present!* The French have gone on building and launching. The Nile might have been long since an ornament to our country, and a remembrance to it, by the name she bears, of the great battle fought by Nelson. Had Nelson lived, what would be his present feelings at the state of our Navy!

minally 74's) mount 146 guns ; most of the others 100, as two-deckers, with a complement of 1000 men.

Frigates (First Class).

The Independence (rasée), 64 guns, thirty-two pounders, built 1814.

	Guns.	Built.
These 4 frigates can mount 60 guns, twenty-four pounders, on their main decks.	United States 44	1797
	Constitution 44	1797
	Guerrière 44	1814
	Java 44	1814
	Potomac 44	1821
	Brandywine 44	1825
	Hudson 44	1826
These 10 frigates can mount 60 thirty-two pounders ; they are superior to our 74's.	Columbia 44	1836
	Lantse 44	building
	Cumberland 44	ditto
	Sabine 44	ditto
	Savannah 44	ditto
	Raritan 44	ditto
	St. Lawrence 44	ditto

Frigates (Second Class).

Constellation, 36 guns.

Macedonian, 36 guns.

Sloops of War.

	Guns.	Built.	Station.
John Adams	24	1799	Mediterranean.
Cyane	24	1815	condemned.

Most of the following ships mount 24 long twenty-four pounders, and have 250 men : —

	Guns.	Built.	Station.
Erie	18	1813	Brazil.
Ontario	18	1813	New York.



	Guns.	Built.	Station.
Peacock	18	1813	East Indies.
Lexington	18	1825	Portsmouth.
Boston	18	1826	West Indies.
Vincennes	18	1826	Pacific.
Natchez	18	1826	Norfolk.
Falmouth	18	1827	Norfolk.
Fairfield	18	1828	Brazil.
Vandalia	18	1828	West Indies.
St. Louis	18	1828	West Indies.
Warren	18	1826	Norfolk.
Concord	18	1828	West Indies.

Schooners.

	Guns.		Station.
Dolphin	12	twenty-four pounders	Brazil.
Shark	12	ditto	Mediterranean.
Enterprise	12	ditto	East Indies.
Boxer	12	ditto	Pacific.
Sea Gull			Philadelphia.
Grampus	12	ditto	West Indies.
Experiment	12	ditto	New York.
Porpoise			Atlantic.
Fox			Baltimore.

Some of the ships in commission have two thirds Englishmen in their crews.

The Egyptian squadron which was cruising lately amounted to 9 ships of 100 guns, and 6 frigates of 60, besides some building. The officers of our ships in the Mediterranean speak of the fair order these ships are in, and their good practice. If they become enemies, they are not to be despised.

ENGLISH BUILDERS. — It is proverbial in our Navy, that we can scarcely build two ships alike — that we have not enough tried to copy the French superb line-of-battle ships.

The Canopus was taken at the Nile forty years ago ; we have only built the Asia and Ganges, and perhaps a couple more after her. The French ships carry their lower-deck ports much higher than ours ; they are stiffer ; while many of our ships are crank — the greatest possible defect in a ship.

THE END.

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